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ON α-ROUGHLY WEIGHTED GAMES
JOSEP FREIXAS AND SASCHA KURZ
ABSTRACT. Gvozdeva, Hemaspaandra, and Slinko (2011) have introduced three hierarchies for simple games in order
to measure the distance of a given simple game to the class of (roughly) weighted voting games. Their third class Cα
consists of all simple games permitting a weighted representation such that each winning coalition has a weight of at least
1 and each losing coalition a weight of at most α. For a given game the minimal possible value of α is called its critical
threshold value. We continue the work on the critical threshold value, initiated by Gvozdeva et al., and contribute some
new results on the possible values for a given number of voters as well as some general bounds for restricted subclasses
of games. A strong relation beween this concept and the cost of stability, i.e. the minimum amount of external payment
to ensure stability in a coalitional game, is uncovered.
1. INTRODUCTION
For a given set N = {1, . . . , n} of n voters a simple game is a function χ : 2N → {0, 1} which is monotone, i.e.
χ(S) ≤ χ(T ) for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N , and fulfills χ(∅) = 0, χ(N) = 1. Here 2N denotes the set of all subsets of N .
Those subsets are also called coalitions and N is called the grand coalition. By representing the subsets of N by
their characteristic vectors in {0, 1}n we can also speak of a (monotone) Boolean function. If χ(S) = 1 then S is
called a winning coalition and otherwise a losing coalition. An important subclass is the class of weighted voting
games for which there are weights wi for i ∈ N and a quota q > 0 such that the condition
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q implies
coalition S is winning and the condition
∑
i∈S wi < q implies coalition S is losing. One attempt to generalize
weighted voting games was the introduction of roughly weighted games, where coalitions S with
∑
i∈S wi = q can
be either winning or losing independently from each other. 1 As some games being important both for theory and
practice are not even roughly weighted, [Gvozdeva et al., 2012] have introduced three hierarchies for simple games
to measure the distance of a given simple game to the class of (roughly) weighted voting games. In this paper we
want to study their third class Cα, where the tie-breaking point q is extended to the interval [1, α] for an α ∈ R≥1.
Given a game χ, the smallest possible value for α is called the critical threshold-value µ(χ) of χ, see the beginning
of Section 2. Let cS(n) denote the largest critical threshold-value within the class of simple games χ ∈ Sn on n
voters. By SpecS(n) := {µ(χ) | χ ∈ Sn} we denote the set of possible critical threshold values.
During the program of classification of simple games, see e.g. [von Neumann and Morgenstern, 2007], several
subclasses have been proposed and analyzed. Although weighted voting games are one of the most studied and
most simple forms of simple games, they have the shortcomming of not covering all games. The classes Cα resolve
this by introducing a parameter α, so that by varying α the classes of games can be made as large as possible.
The critical threshold value in some sense measures the complexity of a given game. Another such measure is the
dimension of a simple game, see e.g. [Taylor and Zwicker, 1993]. Here we observe that there is no direct relation
between these two concepts, i.e. simple games with dimension 1 have a critical threshold value of 1, but simple
games with dimension larger than 1 can have arbitrarily large critical threshold values.
Also graphs have been proposed as a suitable representational language for coalitional games. There are a lot
of different graph-based games like e.g. shortest path games, connectivity games, minimum cost spanning tree
games, and network flow games. The players of a network flow game are the edges in an edge weighted graph,
see [Granot and Granot, 1992] and [Kalai and Zemel, 1982]. For so called threshold network flow games, see e.g.
[Bachrach, 2011], a coalition of edges is winning if and only if those edges allow a flow from a given source to a
sink which meets or exceeds a given quota or threshold. Here the same phenomenon as for weighted voting games
arises, i.e. those graph based weighted games are not fully expressive, but general network flow games are (within
2000 Mathematics Subject Classification. Primary: 91B12; Secondary: 94C10.
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1Some authors, e.g. [Gvozdeva et al., 2012], allow q = 0, which makes sense in other contexts like circuits or Boolean algebra. Later on,
we want to rescale the quota q to one, so that we forbid a quota of zero by definition. Another unpleasant consequence of allowing q = 0 would
be that each simple game on n voters is contained in a roughly weighted game on n + 1 voters, i.e., we can add to each given simple game a
voter who forms a winning coalition on its own to obtain a roughly weighted game.
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the class of stable games). Similarly, one can define a hierarchy by requesting a flow of at least 1 for each winning
coalition and a flow of at least α for each losing coalition.
The concept of the cost of stability was introduced in [Bachrach et al., 2009]. It asks for the minimum amount
of external payment given to the members of a coaltion to ensure stability in a coalition game, i.e., to guarantee a
non-empty core. It will turn out that the cost of stability is closely related to the notion of α-roughly weightedness.
For network flow games some results on the cost of stability can be found in [Resnick et al., 2009].
Another line of research, which is related with our considerations, looks at the approximability of Boolean
functions by linear threshold functions, see [Diakonikolas and Servedio, 2012].
In [Gvozdeva et al., 2012] the authors have proven the bounds 12 ·
⌊
n
2
⌋ ≤ cS(n) ≤ n−22 and determined the
spectrum for n ≤ 6. For odd numbers of voters we slightly improve the lower bound to cS(n) ≥
⌊
n2
4
⌋
/n, which is
conjectured to be tight. As upper bound we prove cS(n) ≤ n3 . In order to determine the exact values of cS(n) for
small numbers of voters we provide an integer linear programming formulation. This approach is capable to treat
cases where exhaustive enumeration is computationally infeasible due to the rapidly increasing number of voting
structures. Admittedly, this newly introduced technique, which might be applicable in several other contexts in
algorithmic game theory too, is still limited to a rather small number of voters.
From known results on the spectrum of the determinants of binary n×n-matrices we are able to conclude some
information on the spectrum of the possible critical threshold values.
The same set of problems can also be studied for subclasses of simple games and we do so for complete simple
games, denoted here by C. Here we conjecture that the maximum critical threshold value cC(n) of a complete
simple game on n voters is bounded by a constant multiplied by
√
n on both sides. A proof could be obtained for
the lower bound, and, for some special subclasses of complete simple games, also for the upper bound. In general,
we can show that cC(n) grows slower than any linear function reflecting the valuation that complete simple games
are somewhat nearer to weighted voting games than general simple games.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows: After this introduction we present the basic definitions
and results on linear programs determining the critical threshold value of a simple game or a complete simple game
in Section 2. In Section 3 we provide certificates for the critical threshold value. General lower and upper bounds
on the maximum possible critical threshold values cS(n) and cC(n) of simple games and complete simple games
are the topic of Section 4. In Section 5 we provide an integer linear programming formulation to determine the
exact value cS(n) and cC(n). To this end we utilize the dual of the linear program determining the critical threshold
value. In Section 6 we give some restrictions on the set of possible critical threshold values and tighten the findings
of [Gvozdeva et al., 2012]. We end with a conclusion in Section 7.
2. PRELIMINARIES
In this paper we want to study different classes of voting structures. As abbreviation for the most general class we
use the notation Bn for the set of Boolean functions f : 2N → {0, 1} with f(∅) = 0 on n variables2 As a shortcut
for the sum of weights
∑
i∈S wi of a coalition S ⊆ N we will use w(S) in the following.
In this section we state the preliminaries, i.e., we define the mentioned classes of voting structures and provide
tailored characterizations of the criticial threshold value within these classes. As a first result we determine the
largest possible critical threshold value for Boolean functions in Lemma 1. Since it is closely related, we briefly
introduce the concept of the cost of stability for binary voting structures.
Definition 1. A (Boolean) function f : 2N → {0, 1} with f(∅) = 0 is called α-roughly weighted for an α ∈ R≥1
if there are weights w1, . . . , wn ∈ R fulfilling
w(S) ≥ 1 ∀S ⊆ N : f(S) = 1
and
w(S) ≤ α ∀S ⊆ N : f(S) = 0.
2We remark that usually f(∅) = 1 is possible for Boolean functions too. In our context the notion of α-roughly weightedness makes sense
for f(∅) = 0, so that we generally require this property. Later on, we specialize these sets to monotone Boolean functions with the additional
restriction f(N) = 1, called simple games, and use the notation Sn. Even more refined subclasses are the set Cn of complete simple games
and the set Wn of weighted voting games on n voters. These sets are ordered as Bn k Sn k Cn k Wn, where the inclusions are strict if n
is large enough. In order to state examples in a compact manner we often choose weighted voting games χ, since they can be represented by
[q;w1, . . . , wn], where q is a quota and the wi are weights. We have χ(S) = 1 if and only if the sum
∑
i∈S
wi ≥ q for each subset S ⊆ N .
ON α-ROUGHLY WEIGHTED GAMES 3
We remark that a function f with f(∅) = 1 cannot be α-roughly weighted for any α ∈ R. In contrast to most
definitions of roughly weighted games we allow negative weights, in the first run, and consider a wider class than
simple games in our initial definition, i.e. Boolean functions with f(∅) = 0. Later on, we will focus on subclasses
of Bn, where we can assume that all weights are non-negative. By Tα (instead of Cα as in [Gvozdeva et al., 2012])
we denote the class of all α-roughly weighted Boolean functions f with f(∅) = 0. If f ∈ Tα but f /∈ Tα′ for all
1 ≤ α′ < α, we call α the critical threshold value µ(f) of f . Given f we can determine the critical threshold value
using the following linear program:
(1)
Min α
w(S) ≥ 1 ∀S ⊆ N : f(S) = 1
w(S) ≤ α ∀S ⊆ N : f(S) = 0
α ≥ 1
w1, . . . , wn ∈ R
We consider it convenient to explicitly add the constraint α ≥ 1 in Definition 1, in accordance with the definition
in [Gvozdeva et al., 2012], and in the linear program (1). Otherwise we would obtain the optimal solution α = 0
for the weighted game [2; 1, 1] ∈ B2 or the optimal solution α = 23 for the weighted game [3; 2, 2, 1, 1] ∈ B4 using
the weights w1 = w2 = 23 and w3 = w4 =
1
3 . Since there are no coalitions with weights strictly between
2
3 and
1 there are no contradicting implications. Arguably, values less than 1 contain more information, but on the other
hand makes notation more complicated. To avoid any misconception we directly require α ≥ 1 (as in Definition 1)
to guarantee non-contradicting implications independently from the possible weights of the coalitions.
At first, we remark that the inequality system (1) has at least one feasible solution given by wi = 1 for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n and α = n. Next we observe that the critical threshold value is a rational number, as it is the optimum
solution of a linear programming problem with rational coefficients, and that we can restrict ourselves to rational
weights wi. For a general Boolean function f : 2N → {0, 1} with f(∅) = 0 negative weights may be necessary
to achieve the critical threshold value. An example is given by the function f of three variables whose entire
set of coalitions S with f(S) = 1 is given by {{1}, {2}, {1, 2}}. By considering the weights w1 = w2 = 1,
w3 = −2 we see that it is 1-roughly weighted. On the other hand we have the inequalities w1 ≥ 1, w2 ≥ 1, and
w1 + w2 + w3 ≤ α = 1 from which we conclude w3 ≤ −1. Another way to look at this example is to say that the
critical threshold value would be 2 if only non-negative weights are allowed. (Here n = 3 voters are the smallest
possibility, i.e. for n ≤ 2 there are non-negative realizations for the critical threshold value.)
A quite natural question is to ask for the largest critical threshold value µ(f) within the class of all Boolean
functions f : 2N → {0, 1} with f(∅) = 0, which we denote by cB(n), i.e. cB(n) = max{µ(f) | f ∈ Bn}.
Lemma 1. cB(n) = n.
Proof. By choosing the weights wi = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have 1 ≤ w(S) ≤ n for all ∅ 6= S ⊆ N . Thus
all functions f : 2N → {0, 1} with f(∅) = 0 are n-roughly weighted. The maximum cB(n) = n is attained for
example at the function with f(N) = 0 and f({i}) = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since the singletons {i} are winning,
we have wi ≥ 1 for all i ∈ N , so that w(N) ≥ n while N is a losing coalition. 
We would like to remark that if we additionally require f(N) = 1, then the critical threshold value is at most
n− 1, which is tight (the proof of Lemma 1 can be easily adapted).
More interesting subclasses of Boolean functions with f(∅) = 0 are simple games, i.e. monotone Boolean
functions with f(∅) = 0 and f(N) = 1, where f(S) ≤ f(T ) for all S ⊆ T . By Tα ∩ Sn we denote the class
of all α-roughly weighted simple games consisting of n voters and by cS(n) := max{µ(f) | f ∈ Sn} the largest
critical threshold value within the class of simple games consisting of n voters. For simple games we can restrict
ourselves to non-negative weights and can drop some of the inequalities in the linear program (1). (This is not true
for general Boolean functions as demonstrated in the previous example.)
Lemma 2. All simple games χ ∈ Tα ∩ Sn admit a representation in non-negative weights.
Proof. Let wi ∈ R, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, be suitable weights. We set w′i := max(wi, 0) ∈ R≥0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
For each winning coalition S ⊆ N we have w′(S) ≥ w(S) ≥ 1. Due to the monotonicity property of simple
games for each losing coalition T ⊆ N the coalition T ′ := {i ∈ T : wi ≥ 0} is also losing. Thus we have
w′(T ) ≤ w(T ′) ≤ α. 
We remark that we have not used χ(∅) = 0 or χ(N) = 1 so that the statement can be slightly generalized.
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Definition 2. Given a simple game χ a coalition S ⊆ N is called a minimal winning coalition if χ(S) = 1 and
χ(S′) = 0 for all proper subsets S′ of S. Similarly, a coalition T ⊆ N is called a maximal losing coalition if
χ(T ) = 0 and χ(T ′) = 1 for all T ′ ⊆ N where T is a proper subset of T ′. By W we denote the set of minimal
winning coalitions and by L the set of maximal losing coalitions.
We would like to remark that a simple game can be completely reconstructed from either the setW of its minimal
winning coalitions or the set L of its maximal losing coalitions, i.e. a coalition S ⊆ N is winning if and only if it
contains a subset S′ ∈ W . Similarly, a coalition T ⊆ N is losing if there is a T ′ ∈ L with T ⊆ T ′.
Proposition 1. The critical threshold value µ(χ) of a simple game χ ∈ Sn is given by the optimal target value of
the following linear program:
Min α
w(S) ≥ 1 ∀S ∈ W
w(S) ≤ α ∀S ∈ L
α ≥ 1
w1, . . . , wn ≥ 0
Proof. Due to Lemma 2 we can assume w.l.o.g. that w1, . . . , wn ≥ 0. With this it suffices to prove that a feasible
solution of the stated linear program is also feasible for the linear program (1). Let S ⊆ N be an arbitrary winning
coalition, i.e., χ(S) = 1. Since there exists an S′ ∈ W with S′ ⊆ S we have
w(S)
wi≥0≥ w(S′) ≥ 1.
Similarly, for each losing coalition T ⊆ N there exists a T ′ ∈ L with T ⊆ T ′ so that we have
w(T )
wi≥0≤ w(T ′) ≤ α.

Again, we have not used χ(∅) = 0 or χ(N) = 1 in the proof.
A well studied subclass of simple games (and superclass of weighted voting games) arises from Isbell’s desir-
ability relation, see [Isbell, 1958]: We write i ⊐ j for two voters i, j ∈ N iff we have χ
(
{i}∪S\{j}
)
≥ χ(S) for
all j ∈ S ⊆ N\{i}. A pair (N,χ) is called a complete simple game if it is a simple game and the binary relation
⊐ is a total preorder. To factor out symmetry we assume i ⊐ j for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, i.e. voter i is at least as
powerful as voter j, in the following. We abbreviate i ⊐ j, j ⊐ i by i  j forming equivalence classes of voters
N1, . . . , Nt. Let us denote |Ni| = ni for 1 ≤ i ≤ t. We assume that those equivalence classes are ordered with
decreasing influence, i.e. for u ≤ v, i ∈ Nu, j ∈ Nv we have i ⊐ j. A coalition in a complete simple game can be
described by the numbers ah of voters from equivalence class Nh, i.e. by a vector (a1, . . . , at). Note that the same
vector represents
(
n1
a1
)(
n2
a2
)
. . .
(
nt
at
)
coalitions that only differ in equivalent voters.
To transfer the concept of minimal winning coalitions and maximal losing coalitions to vectors, we need a
suitable partial ordering:
Definition 3. For two integer vectors a˜ = (a1, . . . , at) and b˜ = (b1, . . . , bt) we write a˜  b˜ if we have
k∑
i=1
ai ≤
k∑
i=1
bi for all 1 ≤ k ≤ t. For a˜  b˜ and a˜ 6= b˜ we use a˜ ≺ b˜ as an abbreviation. If neither a˜  b˜ nor b˜  a˜ holds
we write a˜ ⊲⊳ b˜.
In words, we say that a˜ is smaller than b˜ if a˜ ≺ b˜ and that a˜ and b˜ are incomparable if a˜ ⊲⊳ b˜.
With Definition 3 and the representation of coalitions as vectors in Nt at hand, we can define:
Definition 4. A vector m˜ := (m1, . . . ,mt) in a complete simple game(
(n1, . . . , nt), χ
)
is a shift-minimal winning vector if m˜ is a winning vector and every vector m˜′ ≺ m˜ is losing.
Analogously, a vector m˜ is a shift-maximal losing vector if m˜ is a losing vector and every vector m˜′ ≻ m˜ is
winning.
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As an example we consider the complete simple game χ ∈ C4 whose minimal winning coalitions are given by
{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, and {2, 3, 4}. The equivalence classes of voters are given by N1 = {1} and N2 = {2, 3, 4}.
With this the shift-minimal winning vectors are given by (1, 1) and (0, 3). ByW we denote the set of shift-minimal
winning vectors and by L the set of shift-maximal losing vectors. Each complete simple game can be entirely
reconstructed from either W or L.
In [Carreras and Freixas, 1996] there is a very useful parameterization theorem for complete simple games:
Theorem 1.
(a) Let a vector
n˜ = (n1, . . . , nt) ∈ Nt>0
and a matrix
M =

m1,1 m1,2 . . . m1,t
m2,1 m2,2 . . . m2,t
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
mr,1 mr,2 . . . mr,t
 =

m˜1
m˜2
.
.
.
m˜r

be given, which satisfies the following properties:
(i) 0 ≤ mi,j ≤ nj , mi,j ∈ N≥0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ t,
(ii) m˜i ⊲⊳ m˜j for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ r,
(iii) for each 1 ≤ j < t there is at least one row-index i such that mi,j > 0, mi,j+1 < nj+1 if t > 1 and
m1,1 > 0 if t = 1, and
(iv) m˜i ⋗ m˜i+1 for 1 ≤ i < t (lexicographic order).
Then there exists a complete simple game (N,χ) whose equivalence classes of voters have cardinalities as
in n˜ and whose shift-minimal winning vectors coincide with the rows of M.
(b) Two complete games (n˜1,M1) and (n˜2,M2) are isomorphic, i.e., there exists a permutation of the voters
so that the games are equal, if and only if n˜1 = n˜2 and M1 =M2.
The rows ofM correspond to the shift-minimal winning vectors whose number is denoted by r. The number of
equivalence classes of voters is denoted by t.
By cC(n) := {maxµ(χ) | χ ∈ Cn} we denote the largest critical threshold value within the class of complete
simple games on n voters. As W ⊆ W and L ⊆ L we want to provide a linear programming formulation for the
critical threshold value µ(χ) of a complete simple game χ ∈ Cn, similar to Proposition 1, based on shift-minimal
winning and shift-maximal losing vectors. At first, we show that we can further restrict the set of weights. To this
end we call a feasible solution w of the inequality system in Proposition 1, where α is given, a representation (with
respect to α).
Lemma 3. All complete simple games χ ∈ Tα ∩ Cn admit a representation with weights satisfying w1 ≥ · · · ≥
wn ≥ 0.
Proof. As χ ∈ Cn ⊆ Sn is a simple game, there exists a representation with weights w′1, . . . , w′n ∈ R≥0 due to
Lemma 2. Let (j, h) be the lexicographically smallest pair such that w′j < w′h and j < h. By τ we denote the
transposition (j, h), i.e. the permutation that swaps j and h, and set wi := w′τ(i).
For a winning coalition S with j ∈ S, h /∈ S we have w(S) ≥ w′(S) ≥ 1. If S is a winning coalition with
j /∈ S, h ∈ S then τ(S) is a winning coalition too and we have w(S) = w′(τ(S)) ≥ 1. For a losing coalition T
with j /∈ T , h ∈ T we have w(T ) ≤ w′(T ) ≤ α. If T is a losing coalition with j ∈ T , h /∈ T then τ(T ) is a losing
coalition too and we have w(T ) = w′(τ(T )) ≤ α.
By recursively applying this argument we can construct representing weights fulfilling w1 ≥ · · · ≥ wn ≥ 0. 
We remark that the previous complete simple game with minimal winning coalitions {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, and
{2, 3, 4} can be represented as a weighted voting game [4; 3, 2, 1, 1]. Another representation of the same game
using equal weights for equivalent voters would be [3; 2, 1, 1, 1].
Lemma 4. All complete simple games χ ∈ Tα ∩ Cn admit a representation with weights w1 ≥ · · · ≥ wn ≥ 0
where voters of the same equivalence class have the same weight.
Proof. Let w′1 ≥ · · · ≥ w′n ≥ 0 be a representation of χ and N1, . . . , Nt the set of equivalence classes of voters.
By 1 ≤ j ≤ t we denote the smallest index such that not all voters in Nj have the same weight and define new
weights wi := w′i for all i ∈ N\Nj and wi :=
∑
h∈Nj
w′h
|Nj| , i.e. the arithmetic mean of the previous weights in Nj .
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By recursively applying this construction we obtain a representation with the desired properties. It remains to show
that the new weights wi fulfill the α-conditions.
Let S be a winning coalition with k = |S ∩Nj |. By S′ we denote the union of S\Nj and the k lightest voters
from Nj . Since S′ is a winning coalition too we have w(S) ≥ w′(S′) ≥ 1. Similarly, let T be a losing coalition
with k = |T ∩Nj |: By T ′ we denote the union of T \Nj and the k heaviest voters from Nj . Since T ′ is also a
losing coalition we have w(T ) ≤ w′(T ′) ≤ α. 
Lemma 5. The critical threshold value µ(χ) of a complete simple game χ ∈ Cn with t equivalence classes of
voters is given by the optimal target value of the following linear program:
Min α
t∑
i=1
aiwi ≥ 1 ∀(a1, · · · , at) ∈ W
t∑
i=1
aiwi ≤ α ∀(a1, · · · , at) ∈ L
α ≥ 1
wi ≥ wi+1 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ t− 1
wt ≥ 0
Proof. Due to Lemma 4 we can assume that for the critical threshold value µ(χ) = α there exists a feasible
weighting fulfilling the conditions of the stated linear program. It remains to show that w(W ) ≥ 1 and w(L) ≤ α
holds for all shift-winning vectors W and all losing vectors L. Therefore, we denote by W ′ ∈ W an arbitrary
shift-minimal winning vector with W  W ′ and by L′ ∈ L an arbitrary shift-maximal losing vector with L  L′.
The proof is finished by checking w(L) ≤ w(L′) ≤ α and w(W ) ≥ w(W ′) ≥ 1. 
So, for complete simple games the number of constraints could be further reduced. In this context we remark
that by additionally disregarding the conditions wi ≥ wi+1 from the linear program we would lose the information
about the order on equivalence classes. This effect is demonstrated by the following example. Let us consider the
complete simple game (n1, n2) = (15, 4) with unique shift-minimal winning vector (7, 2). There are two shift-
maximal losing vectors: (8, 0) and (6, 4). Choosing the special solution w1 = 114 , w2 =
1
4 , α =
3
2 would be
feasible for
7w1 + 2w2 ≥ 1
8w1 ≤ α
6w1 + 4w2 ≤ α
α ≥ 1
w1, w2 ≥ 0
For the coalition (8, 1) we obtain the weight 8w1 + 1w2 = 2328 < 1, so that it should be a losing coalition, which is
a contradiction to (8, 1)  (7, 2). So we have to use the ordering on the weights.
At the beginning of this section we have argued that the condition α ≥ 1 is necessary, since otherwise the
optimal target value of the stated linear programming formulations will not coincide with µ(χ) in all cases. On the
other hand, if z⋆(χ) denotes the optimal target value of one of the stated LPs, where we have dropped the condition
α ≥ 1, then we have
µ(χ) = max(z⋆(χ), 1) .
In the following we will drop the condition α ≥ 1 whenever it seems beneficial for the ease of a shorter presentation
while having the just mentioned exact correspondence in mind.
An important solution concept in cooperative game theory is the core, i.e. the set of all stable imputations, see
e.g. [Tijs, 2011] for an introduction. Since the core can be empty under certain circumstances, the possibility of
external payments was considered in order to stabilize the outcome, see [Bachrach et al., 2009]. The external party
quite naturally is interested in minimizing its expenditures. This leads to the concept of the cost of stability (CoS)
of a coalition game. Skipping the relation of CoS with the core, we directly define the cost of stability CoS(f) of
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a given Boolean function f with f(∅) = 0 as the solution of the following linear program:
Min ∆(2)
∆ ≥ 0(3) ∑
i∈N
pi = f(N) + ∆(4) ∑
i∈S
pi ≥ f(S) ∀S ⊆ N(5)
pi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N.(6)
The cost of stability is an upper bound for the critical threshold value:
Lemma 6. For a Boolean function f ∈ Bn with f(N) = 1 we have µ(f) ≤ 1 + CoS(f).
Proof. Let p1, . . . , pn, ∆ be an optimal solution for the above linear program for the cost of stability. If we choose
the weights as wi = pi, then we have wi ∈ R and we have w(S) ≥ 1 for all winning coalitions S due to
constraint (5). Applying constraint (6) and constraint (4) yields
w(S) =
∑
i∈S
pi ≤
∑
i∈N
pi = f(N) + ∆ = 1 + CoS(f)
for all coalitions S ⊆ N . Thus every losing coalition has a weight of at most 1 + CoS(f). 
Due to CoS(f) ≤ n · maxS⊆N f(S) ≤ n, see Theorem 3.4 in [Bachrach et al., 2009], we have CoS(f) ≤ n
for all f ∈ Bn, where equality is attained for the Boolean function with f(S) = 1 for all S 6= ∅. With respect to
Lemma 1 we mention the relation
cB(n) = max
f∈Bn
µ(f) = max
f∈Bn
CoS(f) = n.
On the other hand, we observe that the ratio between CoS(f) and µ(f) can be quite large. Theorem 3.3 in
[Bachrach et al., 2009] states CoS(χ) = n⌈q⌉ − 1 for the weighted voting game χ = [q;w, . . . , w], while we
have µ(χ) = 1. Setting w = q = 1 we see that the ration can become at least as large as n− 1.
By imposing more structure on the set of feasible games, the bound CoS(f) ≤ n, for f ∈ Bn, could be reduced
significantly. To this end we introduce further notation:
Definition 5. A Boolean function f ∈ Bn is called super-additive if we have f(S) + f(T ) ≤ f(S ∪ T ) for all
disjoint coalitions S, T ⊆ N . It is called anonymous if we have f(S) = f(T ) for all coalitions S, T ⊆ N with
|S| = |T |, i.e. the outcome only depends on the cardinality of the coalition.
In our context super-additivity means that each pair of winning coalitions has a non-empty intersection, which
is also called a proper game. These are the most used voting games for real world institutions.
3. CERTIFICATES
In computer science, more precisely in complexity theory, a certificate is a string that certifies the answer to a
membership question (or the optimality of a computed solution). In our context we e.g. want to know whether a
given simple game χ ∈ Sn is α-roughly weighted. If the answer is yes, we just need to state suitable weights.
Given the weights, the answer then can be checked by testing the validity of the inequalities in the linear program
of Proposition 1. Since both W and L form antichains, i.e. no element is contained in another, we can conclude
from Sperner’s theorem that at most 2
(
n
⌊n/2⌋
)
+ n + 1 inequalities have to be checked. But also in the other case,
where the answer is no, we would like to have a computational witness that χ is not α-roughly weighted.
For weighted voting games trading transforms, see e.g. [Taylor and Zwicker, 1999], can serve as a certificate for
non-weightedness. In [Gvozdeva and Slinko, 2011] this concept has been transfered to roughly weighted games
and it was proven that for each non-weighted simple game consisting of n voters there exists a trading transform of
length at most
⌊
(n+ 1) · 2 12n log2 n
⌋
.
Using the concept of duality in linear programming one can easily construct a certificate for the fact that a given
voting structure χ is not α′-roughly weighed for all α′ < α, where α ≥ 1 is fixed. To be more precise, we present
a certificate for the inequality µ(χ) ≥ α.
The dual of a general linear program min cTx,Ax ≥ b, x ≥ 0 (called primal) is given by max bT y,AT y ≤
c, y ≥ 0. The strong duality theorem, see e.g. [Vanderbei, 2008], states that if the primal has an optimal solution,
x⋆, then the dual also has an optimal solution, y⋆, such that cTx⋆ = bT y⋆. As mentioned before, the linear program
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for the determination of the critical threshold value always has an optimal solution, so that we can apply the strong
duality theorem to obtain a certificate.
Considering only a subset of the winning coalitions for the determination of the critical threshold value means
removing some constraints of the corresponding linear program. This enlarges the feasible set such that the optimal
solution will eventually decrease but not increase. For further utilization we state the resulting lower bound for the
critical threshold value of this approach:
Lemma 7. For a given simple game χ ∈ Sn let W ′ be a subset of its winning coalitions and L′ be a subset of its
losing coalitions. If (u, v) is a feasible solution of the following linear program with target value α′ then we have
µ(χ) ≥ α′.
Max
∑
S∈W ′
uS∑
S∈W ′:i∈S
uS −
∑
T∈L′:i∈T
vT ≤ 0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n∑
T∈L′
vT ≤ 1
uS ≥ 0 ∀S ∈ W ′
vT ≥ 0 ∀T ∈ L′
Proof. The stated linear program is the dual of
Min α∑
i∈S
wi ≥ 1 ∀S ∈ W ′
α− ∑
i∈T
wi ≥ 0 ∀T ∈ L′
wi ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n,
which is a relaxation of the linear program (1) determining the critical threshold value. 
To briefly motivate the underlying ideas we consider an example. Let the simple game χ for 5 voters be defined
by its set
{
{1, 2}, {2, 4}, {3, 4}, {2, 5}, {3, 5}
}
of minimal winning coalitions. The set of maximal losing coali-
tions is given by
{
{1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 4, 5}
}
. For this example the linear program of Proposition 1 to determine the
critical α (after some easy equivalence transformations) reads as
Min α s.t.
w1 + w2 ≥ 1
w2 + w4 ≥ 1
w3 + w4 ≥ 1
w2 + w5 ≥ 1
w3 + w5 ≥ 1
α− w1 − w3 ≥ 0
α− w2 − w3 ≥ 0
α− w1 − w4 − w5 ≥ 0
α ≥ 1
w1 ≥ 0, . . . , w5 ≥ 0
(We have replaced the conditions w(S) ≤ α for the losing coalitions S by α− w(S) ≥ 0.)
Running a linear program solver yields the optimal solution w1 = w4 = w5 = 25 , w2 = w3 =
3
5 , and α =
6
5 .
By inserting these values into the inequalities of the stated linear program we can check that χ ∈ T 6
5
∩ S5. Thus
the weights form a certificate for this fact.
To obtain a certificate for the fact that χ /∈ Tα′ for all α′ < 65 , i.e. µ(χ) ≥ 65 , we consider the dual problem:
Max y1 + y2 + y3 + y4 + y5 + z s.t.
y1 − y6 − y8 ≤ 0
y1 + y2 + y4 − y7 ≤ 0
y3 + y5 − y7 ≤ 0
y2 + y3 − y8 ≤ 0
y4 + y5 − y8 ≤ 0
y6 + y7 + y8 + z ≤ 1
y1 ≥ 0, . . . , y8, z ≥ 0
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An optimal solution is given by y1 = y5 = y8 = 25 , y2 = y3 =
1
5 , y7 =
3
5 , and y4 = y6 = z = 0 with target
value 65 (as expected using the strong duality theorem). In combination with the weak duality theorem, see e.g.
[Vanderbei, 2008], the stated feasible dual solution (y, z) is a certificate for the fact that the critical threshold value
for the simple game χ is larger or equal to 65 . In general, the optimal solution vector (y, z) has at most n + 1
non-zero entries so that we obtain a very short certificate.
We would like to remark that one can use the values of the dual variables as multipliers for the inequalities in the
primal problem to obtain the desired bound on the critical threshold value. In our case multiplying all inequalities
with the respective values yields
2
5
· (w1 + w2) + 1
5
· (w2 + w4) + 1
5
· (w3 + w4) + 0 · (w2 + w5) + 2
5
· (w3 + w5)
+0 · (α− w1 − w3) + 3
5
· (α− w2 − w3) + 2
5
· (α− w1 − w4 − w5) + 0 · α
≥ 2
5
+
1
5
+
1
5
+ 0 +
2
5
+ 0 =
6
5
which is equivalent to α ≥ 65 , i.e. a certificate for the fact that χ /∈ Tα′ ∩ S5 for α′ < 65 .
4. MAXIMAL CRITICAL THRESHOLD VALUES
In Lemma 1 we have shown that the maximum critical threshold value of a Boolean function f : 2N → {0, 1}with
f(∅) = 0 is given by cB(n) = n. If additionally f(N) = 1 is required the upper bound drops to n − 1 (which
is tight). In this section, we want to provide bounds for the maximal critical threshold values for simple games
and complete simple games on n voters. By considering a complete simple game with two types of voters we can
derive a lower bound of Ω(
√
n) for cC(n). Apart from constants, this bound is conjectured to be tight. This will
be substantiated by upper bounds of O(
√
n) for cC(n) for several special subclasses of complete simple games.
For the general case, we can only obtain the result that cC(n) is asymptotically smaller than O(n), which is the
asymptotic of the maximum critical threshold value for simple games. Finally, we relate the more sophisticated
upper bounds on the cost of stability from [Bachrach et al., 2009] to upper bounds for the critical threshold value
for other special subclasses of Boolean games.
The authors of [Gvozdeva et al., 2012] have proven the bounds 12
⌊
n
2
⌋ ≤ cS(n) ≤ n−22 for n ≥ 4 and determined
the exact values cS(1) = cS(2) = cS(3) = cS(4) = 1, cS(5) = 65 , cS(6) =
3
2 . By considering null voters we
conclude cS(n) ≤ cS(n+ 1) and cC(n) ≤ cC(n+ 1) for all n ∈ N.
Proposition 2. For n ≥ 4 we have cS(n) ≥
⌊
n2
4
⌋
n .
Proof. For the even integers we took an example from [Gvozdeva et al., 2012] and consider for n = 2k the simple
game uniquely defined by the minimal winning coalitionsWi = {2i−1, 2i} for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Then the two coalitions
L1 = {1, 3, . . . , 2k − 1} and L2 = {2, 4, . . . , 2k} are maximal losing coalitions. Our example given above is of
this type (k = 4). We apply Lemma 7 with uW1 = · · · = uWk = vL1 = vL2 = 12 to deduce cS(n) ≥
k∑
i=1
1
2 =
n
4 .
Using a null voter, as done in [Gvozdeva et al., 2012], gives cS(n) ≥ n−14 for odd n, where
⌊
n2
4
⌋
n − n−14 = n−14n .
For odd n = 2k + 1 we consider the simple game uniquely defined by the minimal winning coalitions Wi =
{i, i + 1} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Two maximal losing coalitions are given by L1 = {1, 3, . . . , 2k + 1} and L2 =
{2, 4, . . . , 2k}. Next we apply Lemma 7 and construct a certificate for cS(n) ≥ (n−1)(n+1)4n =
⌊
n2
4
⌋
n . We set
uW2i−1 =
k+1−i
n , uW2i =
i
n for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, vL1 = kn , vL2 = k+1n and check that it is a feasible solution. Since
n−1∑
i=1
uWi =
k(k+1)
n =
(n−1)(n+1)
4n the proposed lower bound follows. 
So, we are only able to slightly improve the previously known lower bound for cS(n) if the number of voters is
odd. One can easily verify that the given examples have a critical threshold value of
⌊
n2
4
⌋
n .
Conjecture 1. For n ≥ 4 we have cS(n) =
⌊
n2
4
⌋
n .
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We would like to remark that the simple game defined in the proof of Proposition 2 is very far from being the
unique one with µ(χ) =
⌊
n2
4
⌋
n . For the proof we need that L1, L2 are losing coalitions and that the stated subsets of
cardinality two are winning coalitions. We can construct an exponential number of simple games having a critical
α of at least
⌊
n2
4
⌋
n as follows: Let L
′
1 ( L1 and L′2 ( L2 such that none of the winning coalitions of size two
is contained in L′1 ∪ L′2 and |L′1| , |L′2| ≥ 1. With this we can specify the coalition L′1 ∪ L′2 either as winning or
as losing without violating the other properties. This fact suggests that it might be hard to solve the integer linear
program exactly to determine cS(n) for larger values of n, see Section 5.
Another concept to measure the deviation of a simple game χ from a weighted voting game is its dimension, i.e.
the smallest number k of weighted voting games thatχ is given by their intersection, see e.g. [Deı˘neko and Woeginger, 2006].
It is well known that each simple game has a finite dimension (depending on n), see [Taylor and Zwicker, 1993].
Simple games of dimension 1 coincide with weighted voting games having a critical threshold value of 1. The
next possible dimension is two, where the critical threshold can be as large as the best known lower bound of⌊
n2
4
⌋
/n. Thus, there is no direct relation between the dimension of a simple game and its critical threshold value.
To construct such examples we split the voters into sets of cardinality of at least
⌊
n
2
⌋
, i.e. as uniformly distributed
as possible, and assign weight vectors (1, 0) to the elements of one such set and (0, 1) to the elements from the
other set. Using a quota vector (1, 1) we obtain a simple game that satisfies the necessary requirements for a critical
α of at least
⌊
n2
4
⌋
/n. In other words the dimension of a simple game is somewhat independent from the critical
threshold parameter.
Lemma 8. Let χ be a simple game with n voters and µ(χ) = α. If a losing coalition of cardinality k exists, then
we have α ≤ n− k.
Proof. Let S ( N be a losing coalition of cardinality k. We use the weights wi = 0 for all i ∈ S and wi = 1 for
all i ∈ N\S. Since w(N) = n − k the weight of each losing coalition is at most n − k and since each winning
coalition must contain at least one element from N\S their weight is at least 1. 
Lemma 9. Let χ be a simple game with n voters and µ(χ) = α. If the maximum size of a losing coalition is
denoted by k we have α ≤ max(1, k2 ).
Proof. We assign a weight of 1 to every voter i where {i} is a winning coalition and a weight of 12 to every other
voter. Thus each winning coalition has a weight of at least 1 and each losing coalition a weight of at most k2 . 
Corollary 1. For each integer n ≥ 3 we have cS(n) ≤ n3 .
Proof. Let χ be a simple game with largest losing coalition of size k and consisting of n voters. If k ≤ 2n3 then we
have µ(χ) ≤ max (1, k2 ) ≤ n3 . Otherwise, we have µ(χ) ≤ n− k ≤ n3 . 
To further improve Corollary 1 some reduction techniques might be useful.
Lemma 10. If a simple game χ on n ≥ 2 voters contains a winning coalition of cardinality one then we have
µ(χ) ≤ cS(n− 1).
Proof. W.l.o.g. let {n} be a winning coalition. If {1, . . . , n − 1} is a losing coalition then χ is roughly weighted
using the weights w1 = · · · = wn−1 = 0, wn = 1. Otherwise we consider the simple game χ′ arising from χ by
dropping voter n. Let w1, . . . , wn−1 be a weighting for χ′ corresponding to a threshold value of at most cS(n− 1).
By choosing wn = 1 we can extend this to a valid weighting for χ since every coalition which contains voter n is
a winning coalition. 
From now on, we consider complete simple games. To provide a lower bound on cC(n) we consider a special
subclass of complete simple games, i.e., complete simple games with t = 2 types of voters and a unique shift-
minimal winning vector (a, b) (r = 1). So, if a coalition contains at least a voters of the first type and and least
a+ b members in total, then it is winning, otherwise it is losing.
In the following we will derive conditions on the parameters a and b in order to exclude weighted games, which
would lead to a critical threshold value of 1. Since the shift-maximal losing vectors depend on a certain relation
between a and b, we have to consider two different cases to state the linear program to determine the critical
threshold value.
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For a+b−1 ≤ n1 (case 1) the shift-maximal losing vectors are given by (a+b−1, 0), (a−1, n2) and otherwise
(case 2) by (n1, a+ b− 1− n1), (a− 1, n2).
Due to condition (a).(iii) in Theorem 1 we have a > 0. and w1 = w2 = 1b shows that the game is roughly
weighted in this case. For a = n1 a quota of q = n1n2 + b and weights w1 = n2 and w2 = 1 testify that the game
is weighted. So, we only need to consider 1 ≤ a ≤ n1 − 1, 0 ≤ b ≤ n2 − 1. For b = 0 the games are weighted via
quota q = a and weights w1 = 1, w2 = 0. For b = 1 the games are weighted via quota q = an2 + 1 and weights
w1 = n2, w2 = 1. If b = n2 a quota of q = a+ n2 − 1 + an1+n2 and weights of w1 = 1 + 1n1+n2 , w2 = 1 show
that these games are weighted so that we can assume 2 ≤ b ≤ n2 − 2 and n ≥ 6.
To compute cC(n, r = 1, t = 2) we have to solve the linear program
minα s.t.
aw1 + bw2 ≥ 1(7)
α− (a+ b − 1)w1 ≥ 0(8)
α− (a− 1)w1 − n2w2 ≥ 0(9)
w1 ≥ w2(10)
w2 ≥ 0(11)
for case 1 and
minα s.t.
aw1 + bw2 ≥ 1(12)
α− n1w1 − (a+ b− 1− n1)w2 ≥ 0(13)
α− (a− 1)w1 − n2w2 ≥ 0(14)
w1 ≥ w2(15)
w2 ≥ 0(16)
for case 2. We would like to remark that we may also include the constraint α ≥ 1. Once it is tight we have α = 1,
so that we assume α > 1 in the following.
The optimal solution of these linear programs is attained at a corner of the corresponding polytope which is the
solution of a 3-by-3-equation system arising by combining three of the five inequalities. As notation we use A ⊂
{7, 8, 9, 10, 11} with |A| = 3. (Some of these solutions may be infeasible.) At first, we remark that w1 = w2 = 0
is infeasible in both cases so that we assume |A ∩ {10, 11}| ≤ 1.
For case 1 the basic solutions, parameterized by sets of tight inequalities, are given by:
{7, 8, 9} w1 = n2an2+b2 , w2 = ban2+b2 , α =
n2(a+b−1)
an2+b2
, always feasible, e.g. we have n2(b − 1) ≥ b2 due to
b ≤ n2 − 2 and b ≥ 2 so that α ≥ 1 holds.
{7, 8, 10} α = a+b−1a+b < 1, contradiction
{7, 8, 11} w1 = 1a , w2 = 0, α = a+b−1a , always feasible
{7, 9, 10} w1 = 1a+b , w2 = 1a+b , α = a−1+n2a+b , always feasible
{7, 9, 11} α = a−1a < 1, contradiction
{8, 9, 10} α = 0 < 1, contradiction
{8, 9, 11} α = 0 < 1, contradiction
We always have a+b−1a >
a+b−1
a+ b
2
n2
= n2(a+b−1)an2+b2 and
(a+ b) · (an2 + b2) ·
(
a− 1 + n2
a+ b
− n2(a+ b− 1)
an2 + b2
)
= b(n2 − b) + a(n2 − b)2 > 0.
Thus α = n2(a+b−1)an2+b2 is always the minimum value.
For case 2 the basic solutions are given by:
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{12, 13, 14} w1 = n1+n2+1−a−b−a2−2ab+a+an1+n1b+an2+b , w2 = n1+1−a−a2−2ab+a+an1+n1b+an2+b ,
α = n1n2−ab+b−a
2+2a+an1−1−n1
−a2−2ab+a+an1+n1b+an2+b =: α
′
, where we have w1 ≥ w2. α ≥ 1 is equivalent to n1n2 + a− 1−
n1 ≥ −ab+ n1b+ an2 which can be simplified to the valid inequality (n1 − a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1
· (n2 − b− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1
≥ 1.
{12, 13, 15} α = a+b−1a+b < 1, contradiction
{12, 13, 16} w1 = 1a , w2 = 0, α = n1a , always feasible
{12, 14, 15} w1 = 1a+b , w2 = 1a+b , α = a−1+n2a+b , always feasible
{12, 14, 16} α = a−1a < 1, contradiction{13, 14, 15} α = 0 < 1, contradiction
{13, 14, 16} α = 0 < 1, contradiction
α′ ≤ n1a is equivalent to
(n1 + 1− a) · (a(n1 + 1− a) + b(n1 − a))
a · (a(n1 + n2 + 1− a− b) + b(n1 + 1− a)) ≥ 0
and α′ ≤ a−1+n2a+b is equivalent to
(n2 − b)(a(n2 − b) + b)
(a+ b) ·
(
a(n2 − b) + (a+ b)(n1 + 1− a)
) ≥ 0.
Since in both cases all factors are non-negative the respective inequalities are valid and the minimum possible
α-value is given by α′.
To answer the question for the maximum possible α in case 1 depending on n we have to solve the following
optimization problem
max
a+ b− 1
a+ b
2
n2
s.t.
a+ b− 1 ≤ n1
n1 + n2 = n
n1, n2 ≥ 1
1 ≤ a ≤ n1 − 1
2 ≤ b ≤ n2 − 2,
where all variables have to be integers. For z ≥ 1, x > y > 0 we have z−1+xz−1+y > z+xz+y . Thus the maximum is
attained at the minimum value of a which is 1. (a = 1 also yields the weakest constraint a + b − 1 ≤ n1.) Since
1 ≤ a ≤ n1− 1 is equivalent to n1 ≥ 2, which is implied by a+ b− 1 ≤ n1 via b ≥ 2, we can drop this constraint.
If a+ b − 1 < n1 then we could decrease n1 by 1 and increase n2 by 1 yielding a larger target value. Thus we
have a+ b− 1 = n1, which is equivalent to b = n1. Using n1 + n2 = n yields n2 = n− b. Inserting then yields
the optimization problem
max
b
1 + b
2
n−b
, 2 ≤ b ≤ n− 2
2
,
where b, n ∈ N. Relaxing the integrality constraint results in
b =
(√
n− 1) · n
n− 1
with optimal value
n5/2 − 2n2 + n3/2
2n2 − 3n3/2 + n1/2 ≤
√
n
2
tending to
√
n
2 as n approaches infinity. Since the target function is continuous and there is only one inner local
maximum, the optimal integer solution is either b =
⌊
(
√
n− 1) · nn−1
⌋
or b =
⌈
(
√
n− 1) · nn−1
⌉
. For n ≥ 9 also
the condition 2 ≤ b ≤ n−22 is fulfilled. Let us denote the first bound by f1(n) and the second bound by f1(n).
In the following table we compare these bounds with the exact value cC(n), determined using the methods from
Section 5, and
√
n
2 .
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n 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
f1(n) 1.2727 1.3333 1.3846 1.4286 1.4667 1.5000 1.7143 1.7727
f1(n) 1.2000 1.3125 1.4118 1.5000 1.5789 1.6500 1.6296 1.7143
cC(n) 1.3333 1.4074 1.4667 1.5556 1.6500 1.7344 1.8088 1.8750√
n
2 1.5000 1.5811 1.6583 1.7320 1.8028 1.8708 1.9365 2.0000
In case 2 we obtain the optimization problem
max
n1n2 − ab+ b− a2 + 2a+ an1 − 1− n1
−a2 − 2ab+ a+ an1 + n1b + an2 + b s.t.
a+ b− 1 ≥ n1 + 1
n1 + n2 = n
n1, n2 ≥ 1
1 ≤ a ≤ n1 − 1
2 ≤ b ≤ n2 − 2,
For a > 1 we can check that decreasing a, n1 and increasing b, n2 by 1 does not decrease the target value. Thus
we can assume a = 1 in the optimal solution so that the target function simplifies to n1n2n1(b+1)+(n2−b) =
n2
b+1+
n2−b
n1
.
Decreasing b by 1 increases this target function so that either a+ b− 1 ≥ n1 +1 or b ≥ 2 is tight. In the latter case
we would have n1 ≤ 1, which contradicts 1 = a ≤ n1 − 1. Thus, we have a + b − 1 = n1 + 1 in the optimum
which is equivalent to b = n1 + 1. Inserting this and n2 = n− n1 yields the target function
n− b+ 1
b+ 1+ n−2b+1b−1
having the non-negative optimal solution of b = 1+
√
1+n3−2n
n with target value
1
2
·
√
n3 + 1− 2n− (n− 1)
n− 1 ≤
√
n
2
tending to
√
n
2 as n approaches infinity. If the other inequalities are fulfilled, then rounding up or down yields the
optimal integral solution (in this case; not in general). In both cases the conditions 2 ≤ b ≤ n2−2, 1 = a ≤ n1−1
are fulfilled for n ≥ 9. We produce a similar table as before:
n 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
f2(n) 1.1667 1.2308 1.2857 1.3333 1.3750 1.4118 1.4444 1.6250
f2(n) 1.0588 1.1667 1.2632 1.3500 1.4286 1.5000 1.5652 1.5484
cC(n) 1.3333 1.4074 1.4667 1.5556 1.6500 1.7344 1.8088 1.8750
Conjecture 2.
cC(n) ∈ Θ
(√
n
)
.
So far we do not know any examples of complete simple games with a critical threshold value larger than
max
(
1,
√
n
2
)
. We will prove Conjecture 2 for some special classes of complete simple games. An important class,
used by many real-world voting systems, is given by the so-called games with consensus, i.e. intersections of a
weighted voting game and a symmetric game [q′; 1, . . . , 1], see e.g. [Carreras and Freixas, 2004, Peleg, 1992]. The
voting procedure for the council of the European Union based on the Treaty of Nice consists of such a consensus,
i.e. at least 14 (or 18, if the proposal was not made by the commission) of the countries must agree. (The two other
ingredients are a majority of the voting weights and a majority of the population.) Concerning the distribution of
power in the European Union we refer the interested reader to e.g. [Algaba et al., 2007].
Lemma 11. The critical threshold value µ(χ) of a complete simple game χ ∈ Cn with consensus, given as the
intersection of [q;w1, . . . , wn] and [q′; 1, . . . , 1], is at most √n.
Proof. If q′ ≥ √n we take weights of 1√
n
for all voters so that each winning coalition has a weight of at least one
and the grand coalition a weight of
√
n. In the other cases we take weights wiq for the voters so that each winning
coalition has a weight of at least 1. W.l.o.g. we assume wi ≤ q so that the new weights are at most 1. A losing
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coalition with weight larger than one must fail the criterion of the symmetric game so that it consists of less than√
n members. Thus the weight of each losing coalition is less than
√
n. 
For large consensus q′ the critical threshold value is bounded from above by nq′ , since we can assign weights
of 1q′ to all voters. We remark that complete simple games ((n1, n2), (m1,m2)) with two equivalence classes of
voters and one shift-minimal winning vector are games with consensus and thus have a dimension of at most two3.
As representation we may use the intersection of [m1 +m2; 1, . . . , 1] and [m1n2 +m2;n2, . . . , n2, 1, . . . , 1].
Lemma 12. The critical threshold value µ(χ) of a complete simple game χ ∈ Cn with two types of voters is at
most
√
n+ 1.
Proof. If χ has only one shift-minimal winning vector we can apply Lemma 11. Since complete simple games with
less than four voters are weighted we can assume n ≥ 4. So let m1 = (a, b) the shift-minimal winning vector with
maximal a and m2 = (c, d) the shift-minimal winning vector with minimal c. Depending on the values of a and
c we will provide suitable weights w1 and w2 such that each winning coalition has a weight of at least q > 0 and
each losing coalition has a weight of at most q · (√n+1), i.e. the proposed weights have to be normalized in order
to fit into the framework of a quota q = 1.
If c ≥ 1 we set w1 =
√
n and w2 = 1. Every shift-minimal winning vector (e, f) 6= (a, b) must fulfill c ≤ e ≤ a
due to the definition of a, c and e + f ≥ a + b + 1 since otherwise (a, b) would not be a shift-minimal winning
vector. With this we have
ew1 + fw2 ≥ ew1 + (a+ b+ 1− e)w2 ≥ c
√
n+ (a+ b+ 1− c).
Similarly, we obtain
aw1 + bw2 = c
√
n+ a− c+ b+ (a− c︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1
) · (√n− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1
) ≥ c√n+ (a+ b + 1− c).
Thus it suffices to show that each losing coalition has a weight of at most(
c
√
n+ (a+ b+ 1− c)) · (√n+ 1) ≥ n+ a√n+ b√n.
Let (g, h) be a losing coalition so that (g, h)  (a, b) and (g, h)  (c, d). If g ≤ c then h ≤ n2 ≤ n − a and we
have
gw1 + hw2 ≤ c
√
n+ n− a ≤ n+ a√n.
If g ≥ a then g + h ≤ a+ b− 1 since otherwise (g, h)  (a, b). With this we have
gw1 + hw2 ≤ (a+ b− 1)
√
n ≤ a√n+ b√n.
If c ≤ g < a then g + h ≤ c+ d− 1 since otherwise (g, h)  (c, d). With this we have
gw1 + hw2 ≤ (a− 1)
√
n+ (c+ d− a) ≤ n+ a√n.
If c = 0 we set w1 =
√
d, where d ≥ a+ b+ 1 ≥ 2, and w2 = 1. Let (e, f) be a winning and (g, h) be a losing
coalition. Similarly, as before we have e+ f ≥ a+ b so that
ew1 + fw2 ≥
√
d+ a+ b− 1.
It suffices to show that each losing coalition has a weight of at most(√
d+ a+ b− 1
)
· (√n+ 1) ≥ √dn−√n+√d︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥d
+ (a+ b)
√
n+ a+ b− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≥ d+ (a+ b)√n.
If g ≥ a then g + h ≤ a+ b− 1, since otherwise (g, h)  (a, b), and we have
gw1 + hw2 ≤ (a+ b− 1)
√
d ≤ (a+ b)√n.
If c ≤ g < a then g + h ≤ c+ d− 1, since otherwise (g, h)  (c, d), and we have
gw1 + hw2 ≤ (a− 1)
√
d+ (c+ d− a) ≤ a√n+ d.

3Complete simple games with one shift-minimal winning vector and more than two equivalence classes of voters can have dimensions larger
than two and as large as n
4
[Freixas and Puente, 2008].
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We remark that complete simple games with one type of voters are weighted and thus have a critical threshold
value of 1.
Lemma 13. The critical threshold value µ(χ) of a complete simple game χ ∈ Cn with one shift-minimal winning
vector a˜ is at most
√
n.
Proof. By (n1, . . . , nt) we denote the numbers of voters in the t ≥ 2 equivalence classes of voters and by
(a1, . . . , at) the unique shift-minimal winning vector a˜.
If
t∑
i=1
ai ≥
√
n we set wi = 1√n for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t and have w(a˜) ≥ 1. Since with these weights we have
w(N) ≤ √n, every losing coalition has a weight of at most √n and we have a critical threshold value of at most√
n.
In the remaining cases we have
t∑
i=1
ai ≤
√
n. Due to condition (a)(iii) of Theorem 1 we have a1 ≥ 1. We
set w1 = 1 and w2 = · · · = wt = 0 and have w(a˜) ≥ 1. For every losing vector l˜ = (l1, . . . , lt) we have
l1 <
t∑
i=1
ai ≤
√
n since otherwise we would have a˜ ≺ l˜. Thus each losing coalition has a weight of at most √n
and the critical threshold value is bounded from above by
√
n in this case. 
So, we have an upper bound of
√
n for the critical threshold value for complete simple games on n voters in
several subcases. For the general case of Conjecture 2 we can provide only a first preliminary bound showing that
cC(n) asymptotically grows slower than cB(n) so that the maximum critical threshold value in some sense states
that complete simple games are nearer to (roughly) weighted voting games than simple games.
Theorem 2. The critical threshold value µ(χ) of a complete simple game χ ∈ Cn is in O
(
n·log log n
log n
)
.
Proof. As weights we choose a slowly decreasing geometric series wi = qi−1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n where q =
1 − lognn·log logn . With this we have 0 ≤ q < 1 and 11−q = n·log log nlog n . Now, let W be a winning coalition with the
minimum weight and L be a losing coalition with the maximum weight. In the following we will show w(L)w(W ) ≤
n·log logn
logn . To deduce this bound we will compare the weights of a few subsets of consecutive voters. In order
to keep the necessary number of such subsets small, we set W˜ := W\(W ∩ L) and L˜ := L\(W ∩ L), i.e. we
technically remove common voters. We remark that W˜ needs not be a winning coalition. Due to the inequality
x
y
≥ x+ c
y + c
for x ≥ y > 0 and c ≥ 0 it suffices to provide an upper bound for w(L˜)
w(W˜ )
.
At first, we consider the case when W is lexicographically larger than L. Let j be the voter with the minimal
index (and so the maximal weight) in W˜ . With this we set W ′ = {j}, L′ = {j + 1, . . . , n} and have w(W˜ ) ≥
w(W ′), w(L˜) ≤ w(L′) so that w(L)w(W ) is upper bounded by
w(L˜)
w(W˜ )
≤ w(L
′)
w(W ′)
=
q(1− qn−j)
1− q ≤
1
1− q =
n · log logn
log n
.
If W is lexicographically smaller than L then let j be an index with | W˜︸︷︷︸∩{1, . . . , j}
=:k1
| > | L˜︸︷︷︸∩{1, . . . , j}
=:k2
|. With
this we set L′ := {1, . . . , k2} ∪ {j + 1, . . . , n} and W ′ := {j − k1 + 1, . . . , j} fulfilling w(W˜ ) ≥ w(W ′) and
w(L˜) ≤ w(L′). Since k1 ≥ k2 ≥ 1,
w(L′) =
k2∑
i=1
qi−1 +
n∑
i=j+1
qi−1 =
1− qk2
1− q + q
j · 1− q
n−j
1− q
and w(W ′) = qj−k1+1 · 1−qk11−q ≥ qj−k1+1 we have
w(L)
w(W )
≤ w(L˜)
w(W˜ )
≤ w(L
′)
w(W ′)
≤ qk1−j−1 +
qj · 11−q
qj−k1+1
≤ q−j + 1
1− q ≤ q
−n +
1
1− q .
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To finish the proof we show q−n ∈ O
(
n·log logn
log n
)
. From x1+x ≤ log(1 + x) ≤ x for x > −1 we conclude
2x ≥ x1−x ≥ − log(1− x) ≥ x for 12 ≤ x ≤ 1. Thus for large enough n we have
log
(
q−n
) ≤ n · (− log(1− logn
n · log logn
))
≤ n · 2 logn
n · log logn ≤
2 logn
log logn
and 2 lognlog log n ≤ logn− log logn+ log log logn = log
(
n·log logn
logn
)
. 
In the context of the conjectured upper bound of O(√n) for cC(n) we find it remarkable that the cost of sta-
bility CoS(f) of any super-additive, see Definition 5, Boolean game f ∈ Bn is upper bounded by √n − 1, see
[Bachrach et al., 2009]. If f is additionally anonymous, then the authors have proven the tighter bound CoS(f) ≤
2. This coincides with the situation for the critical threshold value. Here we may consider the super-additive
anonymous Boolean game f ∈ Bn, where coalitions of size
⌈
n+1
2
⌉
are winning and the grand coalition N is losing.
5. AN INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAMMING APPROACH TO DETERMINE THE MAXIMAL CRITICAL THRESHOLD
VALUE
In principle it is possible to determine the maximal critical threshold value cS(n) for a given integer n by simply
solving the stated linear program from Proposition 1 for all simple games χ ∈ Sn. Since for n ≤ 8 there are 1,
4, 18, 166, 7 579, 7 828 352, 2 414 682 040 996, and 56 130 437 228 687 557 907 786 simple games, an exhaustive
search seems to be hopeless even for moderate n (of course theoretical results may help to reduce the number of
simple games which need to be checked). For n = 9 only the lower bound 1042 is known.
So, alternatively we will formulate cS(n) as the solution of an optimization problem in the following to avoid
exhaustive enumeration. It is possible to describe the set of monotone Boolean functions as integer points of
a polyhedron, see e.g. [Kurz, 2012b]: For each subset S ⊆ N we introduce a binary variable xS and use the
constraints x∅ = 0, xN = 1, and xS\{i} ≤ xS for all ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , i ∈ S to model a simple game via χ(S) = xS .
(We have to remark that this ILP formulation is very symmetric.) In this framework it is very easy to add additional
restrictions. Methods to restrict the underlying games to complete simple games or weighted voting games are
outlined in [Kurz, 2012b]. The restriction to e.g. proper simple games can be modeled via xS + xN\S ≤ 1 for all
S ⊆ N . Similarly, strong simple games can be modeled by using the constraints xS + xN\S ≥ 1 for all S ⊆ N .
So the problem of determining cS(n) can be stated as the following optimization problem: Maximize over
all simple games with n voters the minimum α of the linear program (1). Since this is a two-level optimization
problem, we have to reformulate the problem in order to apply integer linear programing techniques.
In order to determine cS(n) we cannot maximize α directly since we have χ ∈ Tλα ∩ Sn for all λ ≥ 1 if
χ ∈ Tα ∩ Sn. To specify the minimum value α for a given simple game χ we can also maximize its corresponding
dual linear program of (1) whose optimal solution is α.
If we drop the restriction α ≥ 1 and assume wi ≥ 0, the dual program for a simple game χ is given by
Max
∑
S∈W
uS∑
S∈W :i∈S
uS −
∑
S∈L:i∈S
vS ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ N∑
S∈L
vS ≤ 1
uS ≥ 0 ∀S ∈W
vS ≥ 0 ∀S ∈ L,
where W denotes the set of winning coalitions and L denotes the set of losing coalitions. As outlined in Section 2
the optimal target value
∑
S∈W
uS might take values smaller than 1 (but being non-negative) which correspond to a
critical threshold value of µ(χ) = 1.
ON α-ROUGHLY WEIGHTED GAMES 17
The next step is to replace the externally given sets W and L by variables such that the possible sets correspond
to simple games. Using our previously defined binary variables xS this is rather easy:
Max
∑
S⊆N
xS · uS∑
{i}⊆S⊆N
xS · uS −
∑
{i}⊆S⊆N
(1− xS) · vS ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ N∑
S⊆N
(1− xS) · vS ≤ 1
x∅ = 0
xN = 1
xS\{i} ≤ xS ∀∅ 6= S ⊆ N
uS ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆ N
vS ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆ N
xS ∈ {0, 1} ∀S ⊆ N,
.
The problem is a quadratically constrained quadratic program (QCQP) with binary variables or more generally a
mixed-integer quadratically constrained program (MIQCP). There are solvers, like e.g. ILOG CPLEX, that can deal
with these problems efficiently whenever the target function and the constraints are convex. Unfortunately, neither
our target function nor the feasibility set is convex. Thus in order to solve this optimization problem directly, we
have to utilize a solver that can deal with non-convex mixed-integer quadratically constrained programs like e.g.
SCIP, see e.g. [Berthold et al., 2011a, Berthold et al., 2011b]4.
This works in principle, but problems become computationally infeasible very quickly. By disabling preprocess-
ing we can force SCIP to use general MIQCP-techniques. Solving the problem Boolean functions with f(∅) = 0
and n = 3 took 0.07 seconds and 43 b&b-nodes, for n = 4 it took 8.45 seconds and 15770 b&b-nodes, and for
n = 5 we have aborted the solution process after 265 minutes and 1.6 · 106 nodes, where more than 33 GB of
memory was used.
By enabling preprocessing SCIP is able to automatically find a reformulation as a binary linear program. This
way SCIP can solve the instance for n = 8 in 2.9 seconds in the root node but will take more than 211 minutes,
373000 nodes, and 1.8 GB of memory to solve the instance for n = 9.
Since often binary linear programs are easier to solve than binary quadratic problems, we want to reformulate our
binary quadratic optimization problem into a binary linear one. There are several papers dealing with reformulations
of MIQCPs into easier problems, see e.g. [Letchford and Galli, 2011]. Here we want to present a custom-tailored
approach based on some techniques that are quite standard in the mixed integer linear programing community (but
we will outline them nevertheless). Using this formulation, SCIP needed only 18.72 seconds to solve the instance
for n = 15 without applying branch&bound. We would like to remark that CPLEX was even faster using only
5.61 seconds of computation time.
A quite general technique to get rid of logical implications are so called Big-M constraints, see e.g. [Koch, 2004].
To explain the underlying concept we consider a binary variable x ∈ {0, 1}, a real-valued variable y, and a condi-
tional inequality y ≤ c for a constant c, which only needs to be satisfied if x = 1. The idea is to use this inequality,
but to modify its right-hand side with a constant times (1− x):
y ≤ c+ (1 − x) ·M.
For x = 1 this inequality is equivalent to the desired conditional inequality. Otherwise the new inequality is
equivalent to y ≤ c + M , which is satisfied if M is large enough. Given a known upper bound y ≤ u, where
possibly u≫ c, it suffices to choose M = u− c.
Now we want to apply this technique in a more sophisticated way, to remove the non-linear term xS · uS , where
xS ∈ {0, 1} and uS ∈ [0, β]. We replace the term xS · uS by the variable z ≥ 0 using the constraints z ≤ βxS ,
z ≤ uS , and z ≥ uS − β (1− xS). If xS = 1 these inequalities state that z = xS · uS = uS must hold and for
xS = 0 they imply z = xS · uS = 0. Thus one extra variable and three additional inequalities are necessary for
each term of the form xS · uS or xS · vS . The LP relaxation gets worser with increasing β, the so-called Big-M
constant. Of course in general, it may be hard to come up with a concrete bound β. In our case it is not too hard to
prove uS , vS ≤ 1: If xT = 0 then from vS ≥ 0 for all S ⊆ N and
∑
S⊆N
(1− xS) · vS ≤ 1 we conclude vT ≤ 1.
4We have to remark that currently SCIP is not capable of solving the stated problem without further information because there are some
problems if the intermediate LP relaxations are unbounded. So one has to provide upper and lower bounds for the continuous variables uS and
vS .
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Otherwise vT does not occur anywhere in the optimization problem and vT ≤ 1 is a valid inequality. Similarly, if
xT = 0 then uT does not appear anywhere and on the other hand for xT = 1 we have
uT ≤
∑
{i}⊆S⊆N
(1− xS) · vS ≤
∑
S⊆N
(1− xS) · vS ≤ 1.
Due to the special structure of our problem we can reformulate our problem without additional variables and
fewer additional constraints. The main idea is to use the term uS instead of xS · uS and to ensure that we have
uS = 0 for xS = 0. Similarly, we replace the products (1− xS) · vS by vS and ensure that we have vS = 0 if
xS = 1.
max
∑
S⊆N
uS(17)
x∅ = 0(18)
xN = 1(19)
xS − xS\{i} ≥ 0 ∀∅ 6= S ⊆ N, i ∈ S(20) ∑
{i}⊆S⊆N
uS −
∑
{i}⊆S⊆N
vS ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ N(21)
∑
S⊆N
vS ≤ 1(22)
uS ≤ xS ∀S ⊆ N(23)
vS ≤ 1− xS∀S ⊆ N(24)
xS ∈ {0, 1} ∀S ⊆ N(25)
uS ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆ N(26)
vS ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆ N(27)
Inequalities (21) and (22) capture the dual linear program to bound α = ∑
S⊆N
uS from above. Inequality (23)
models the implication that uT is zero if xT = 0. In the other case where xT = 1 the inequality uT ≤ 1 is
redundant since we have for an i ∈ T (x∅ = 0) the inequality
∑
{i}⊆S⊆N
uS −
∑
{i}⊆S⊆N
≤ 0 from which we
conclude xT ≤ 1 using xS ≥ 0 and
∑
S⊆N
vS ≤ 1. Inequalities of that type are called Big-M inequalities, where
we have an Big-M of 1 in our two cases. (See Inequality (34) for an example with a Big-M constant larger than 1.)
Similarly, Inequality (24) models the implication that vT is zero if xT = 1. In the other case where xT = 0 we
have the redundant inequality vT ≤ 1.
The optimum target value of this ILP is the desired value cS(n) for each integer n. We have to remark that our
modeling of the set of simple games is highly symmetric and each solution comes with at least n! isomorphic solu-
tions which is an undesirable feature for an ILP model. With the stated ILP model we were able to computationally
prove Conjecture 1 for n ≤ 9 taking less than 37 seconds for n = 7, less than 279 seconds for n = 8 but already
66224 seconds and 161898779 branch&bound nodes for n = 9. For n = 10 we have computationally obtained the
bounds 52 ≤ cS(10) ≤ 3 from an aborted ILP solution process. (The LP relaxation gives only the relatively poor
upper bound of n−12 .)
We would like to remark that we can enhance this ILP formulation a bit. Since we have cS(n+ 1) ≥ cS(n) we
may apply Lemma 10 and require x{i} = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where n ≥ 2.
If we replace conditions (20) by those for complete simple games we can determine the exact values cC(n) for
n ≤ 16: cC(1) = cC(2) = cC(3) = cC(4) = cC(5) = cC(6) = 1, cC(7) = 87 , cC(8) = 2621 , cC(9) = 43 , cC(10) = 3827 ,
cC(11) = 2215 , cC(12) =
14
9 , cC(13) =
33
20 , cC(14) =
111
64 , cC(15) =
123
68 , and cC(16) =
15
8 .
We would like to remark that the LP relaxation gives only the poor upper bound cC(n) ≤ n−12 .
6. THE SPECTRUM OF CRITICAL THRESHOLD VALUES
In sections 4 and 5 we have considered the maximum critical threshold value for several classes of games. By
SpecS(n) we denote the entire set of possible critical threshold values of simple games on n voters. Similarly,
we define SpecB(n) as the set of possible critical threshold values for Boolean functions f : 2N → {0, 1} with
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f(∅) = 0 and SpecC(n) as the set of possible critical threshold values for complete simple games on n voters. In
this section we will provide a superset for the spectrum using known information of the set of possible determinants
of 0/1 matrices. In order to compute the exact sets for small values of n we modify the presented integer linear
programming approach for the determination of the maximum critical threshold value to that end.
By considering null voters we concludeSpecS(n) ⊆ SpecS(n+1), SpecB(n) ⊆ SpecB(n+1), andSpecC(n) ⊆
SpecC(n+1). Due to the inclusion of the classes of games we obviously have SpecC(n) ⊆ SpecS(n) ⊆ SpecB(n)
for all n ∈ N.
Principally, it is possible to determine the sets SpecS(n) for small numbers of voters by exhaustive enumeration
of all simple games. As mentioned in the previous section this approach is very limited due to the quickly increasing
number of simple games. In [Gvozdeva et al., 2012] the authors have determined SpecS(n) for all n ≤ 6 by some
theoretical reductions and exhaustive enumeration on the restricted set of possible games.
In this section we want to develop an approach based on integer linear programming to determine the spectrum
and to utilize results on Hadamard’s maximum determinant problem to obtain a superset of the spectrum. For the
latter let us consider the linear program (1) determining the critical threshold value of a Boolean function with
f(∅) = 0. Each element of the spectrum SpecB(n) appears as the optimal solution of this linear program for a
certain Boolean function f . If inequality α ≥ 1 is attained with equality in the optimal solution, the critical thresh-
old value is 1. So we may drop this inequality and consider only those functions f where the linear program (1)
without the inequality α ≥ 1 has an optimal solution, which is then attained in a corner. Thus there are subsets
W1, . . . ,Wk ⊆ N , where 0 ≤ k ≤ n + 1, with
∑
j∈Wi
wj = 1 and n + 1 − k subsets L1, . . . , Ln+1−k ⊆ N with
−α + ∑
j∈Li
wj = 0 such that the entire linear equation system has a unique solution. (We remark that k = 0 and
k = n+ 1 lead to infeasible solutions.)
Writing this equation system in matrix notation A · (w1, . . . , wn, α)T = b we can use Cramer’s rule to state
α =
det(Aα)
det(A)
,
where Aα arises from A by replacing the rightmost column by b. Since Aα is a 0/1-matrix we can use an improved
version of Hadamard’s bound and have
|det(Aα)| ≤ (n+ 2)
(n+2)/2
2n+1
,
see e.g. [Brenner and Cummings, 1972]. If we multiply the rightmost column of A by −1, which changes the
determinant by a factor of (−1)n+1 then it becomes a 0/1-matrix too and we conclude
|det(A)| ≤ (n+ 2)
(n+2)/2
2n+1
.
Lemma 14. For each α ∈ SpecB(n) there are coprime integers 1 ≤ q < p ≤
⌊
(n+2)(n+2)/2
2n+1
⌋
with α = pq .
For specific n the uppers bounds on the determinant of 0/1-matrices can be improved. The exact values for the
maximum determinant of a n×n binary matrix for n ≤ 17 are given by 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 32, 56, 144, 320, 1458, 3645,
9477, 25515, 131072, 327680, 1114112, see e.g. sequence A003432 in the on-line encyclopedia of integer se-
quences and the references therein.
Another restriction on the possible critical threshold values is obviously given by the maximum values, i.e.
µ(χ) ≤ cB(n) (or µ(χ) ≤ cS(n) for simple games, µ(χ) ≤ cC(n) for complete simple games. Further restrictions
come from the possible spectrum of determinants of binary matrices. For binary n × n-matrices all determinants
between zero and the maximal value can be attained. For n ≥ 7 gaps occur, see e.g. [Craigen, 1990]. The spectrum
of the determinants of binary 7×7-matrices was determined in [Metropolis, 1971] to be {1, . . . , 18}∪{20, 24, 32}.
Using this more detailed information we can conclude that the denominator q of the critical threshold value of a
Boolean function with f(∅) = 0 on 6 voters is at most 17. Thus, we are able to compute a finite superset Λ(n) of
SpecB(n) for each number n of voters.
Our next aim is to provide an ILP formulation in order to determine the entire spectrum for simple games and
complete simple games on n voters. Therefore, we consider the linear program (1) for the determination of the
critical threshold value. Dropping the constraint α ≥ 1 and assuming wi ≥ 0 we abbreviate the emerging linear
program by min cTx, Ax ≥ b, x ≥ 0. If its optimal value is at least 1 then it coincides with the critical threshold
value. Otherwise the game is weighted. By the strong duality theorem its dual max bT y AT y ≤ c, y ≥ 0 has the
same optimal solution if both are feasible. This is indeed the case taking the dual solution y = 0 and primal weights
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of 1 with an α of n. Thus, we can read of the critical threshold value as cTx from each feasible solution of the
inequality system Ax ≥ b, AT y ≤ c, cTx = bTy, x, y ≥ 0.
As done in Section 5 we model the underlying simple game by binary variables xS for the subsets S ⊆ N and
use Big-M constraints:
x∅ = 0(28)
xN = 1(29)
xS − xS\{i} ≥ 0 ∀∅ 6= S ⊆ N, i ∈ S(30)
xS ∈ {0, 1} ∀S ⊆ N(31)
wi ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ N(32) ∑
i∈S
wi ≥ xS ∀S ⊆ N(33) ∑
i∈S
wi ≤ α+ |S| · xS ∀S ⊆ N(34)
wn ≥ 0(35)
∑
{i}⊆S⊆N
uS −
∑
{i}⊆S⊆N
vS ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ N(36)
∑
S⊆N
vS ≤ 1(37)
uS ≤ xS ∀S ⊆ N(38)
vS ≤ 1− xS∀S ⊆ N(39)
uS ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆ N(40)
vS ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆ N(41) ∑
S⊆N
uS = α(42)
Inequalities (28)-(31) model the simple games. The primal program to determine the critical threshold value is
given as inequalities (32)-(35). W.l.o.g. we can restrict the weights to lie inside [0, 1]. Inequality (33) states that
the weight of each winning coalition is at least 1 and that the weight of each losing coalition is at least zero, which
is a valid inequality. Similarly, Inequality (34) is fulfilled for xS = 1 and translates to w(S) ≤ α for each losing
coalition S. The formerly used dual linear program is stated in inequalities (36)-(41). Finally the coupling of the
primal and the dual target value is enforced in Inequality (42).
We remark that in order to destroy a bit of the inherent symmetry, i.e. the group of all permutations on n elements
acts on the set of simple games, we might require w1 ≥ · · · ≥ wn.
Having this inequality system at hand, one may prescribe each element in Λ(n) as a possible value for α and
check whether it is feasible, then α is contained in the spectrum, or not.
Another possibility to determine the entire spectrum is to solve a sequence of ILPs, where we add the target
function minα and the constraint α ≥ l. As starting value we choose l = min{v ∈ Λ(n) : v > 1}. If the optimal
target value is given by α′, we choose l = min{v ∈ Λ(n) : v > α′} until the set is empty. We remark that for
larger n the values of Λ(n) might be relatively close to each other so that numerical problems may occur.
Using the latter approach, we have verified the results SpecS(1) = SpecS(2) = SpecS(3) = SpecS(4) =
{1}, SpecS(5) =
{
1, 65 ,
7
6 ,
8
7 ,
9
8
}
, and SpecS(6) = SpecS(5) ∪
{
3
2 ,
4
3 ,
5
4 ,
9
7 ,
10
9 ,
11
9 ,
11
10 ,
12
11 ,
13
10 ,
13
11 ,
13
12 ,
14
11 ,
14
13 ,
15
13 ,
15
14 ,
16
13 ,
16
15 ,
17
13 ,
17
14 ,
17
15 ,
17
16
}
already given in [Gvozdeva et al., 2012]. For n = 7 we have newly determined the
smallest non-trivial critical threshold valueminSpecS(7)\{1} = 4039 . 5 Forn = 8we conjectureminSpecS(8)\{1} =
105
104
6
.
5Since the possible spectrum of determinants is given by {0, . . . , 40, 42, 44, 45, 48, 56}, see e.g.
http://www.indiana.edu/∼maxdet/spectrum.html, only 45
44
had to be ruled out.
6Here the possible spectrum of determinants is given by {0, . . . , 102, 104, 105, 108, 110, 112, 116, 117, 120, 125, 128, 144} so that only
117
116
might be possible.
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By dropping the inequalities (29), (30) and permitting negative weights, i.e. wi ∈ R, we can principally deter-
mine the entire spectrum for Boolean functions with f(∅) = 0. For small n, the explicit sets are given by
SpecB(1) = {1}
SpecB(2) = {1, 2}
SpecB(3) =
{
1,
3
2
, 2, 3
}
SpecB(4) =
{
1,
5
4
,
4
3
,
3
2
,
5
3
, 2,
5
2
, 3, 4
}
SpecB(5) =
{
1,
9
8
,
8
7
,
7
6
,
6
5
,
5
4
,
9
7
,
4
3
,
7
5
,
3
2
,
8
5
,
5
3
,
7
4
,
9
5
, 2,
9
4
,
7
3
,
5
2
,
8
3
, 3,
7
2
, 4, 5
}
SpecB(6) =
{
1,
18
17
,
17
16
,
16
15
,
15
14
,
14
13
,
13
12
,
12
11
,
11
10
,
10
9
,
9
8
,
17
15
,
8
7
,
15
13
,
7
6
,
13
11
,
6
5
,
17
14
,
11
9
,
16
13
,
5
4
,
14
11
,
9
7
,
13
10
,
17
13
,
4
3
,
15
11
,
11
8
,
18
13
,
7
5
,
17
12
,
10
7
,
13
9
,
16
11
,
3
2
,
17
11
,
14
9
,
11
7
,
8
5
,
13
8
,
18
11
,
5
3
,
17
10
,
12
7
,
7
4
,
16
9
,
9
5
,
11
6
,
13
7
,
15
8
,
17
9
, 2,
17
8
,
15
7
,
13
6
,
11
5
,
9
4
,
16
7
,
7
3
,
12
5
,
5
2
,
13
5
,
8
3
,
11
4
,
14
5
, 3,
13
4
,
10
3
,
7
2
,
11
3
, 4,
9
2
, 5, 6
}
For complete simple games we simply replace the conditions (28)-(31) by those for complete simples games.
As complete simple games with up to 6 voters are roughly weighted, we have SpecC(n) = {1} for n ≤ 6. For
n = 7 we have determined min
{
SpecC(7)\{1}
}
= 3938 .
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have considered the critical threshold values for several subclasses of binary voting structures. For
Boolean games an exact upper bound of µB(n) = n could be determined. The set of achievable values is strongly
related to the spectrum of determinants of binary matrices, so that Hadamard’s bound comes into play.
We have strengthened the lower and upper bound on the maximum critical threshold value of a simple game
on n voters to
⌊
n2
4
⌋
/n ≤ cS(n) ≤ n3 . It remains to prove (or to disprove) the conjecture that the lower bound is
tight. By introducing an integer linear programming approach to determine the maximum critical threshold value
we could algorithmically verify this conjecture for all n ≤ 9. On the one hand, this seems to be a rather small
number. On the other hand, regarding the question of the number of simple games, not much more than a lower
bound of 1042 is known. Since the number of simple games grows doubly exponential, no huge improvements can
be expected from an algorithmic point of view.
For complete simple games the problem to determine cC(n) is considerably harder. The large gap between the
stated upper bound c1n log log nlog n and lower bound c2
√
n deserves to be closed or at least to be narrowed. In order
to facilitate the conjectured asymptotics of Θ(√n) we have provided a class of examples achieving this bound and
have proven the respective upper bounds for several subclasses of complete simple games.
So far we have no structural insights on those complete simple games which achieve cC(n) as their critical thresh-
old value. The given integer linear programming formulation for cC(n) made it possible to determine exact values
for numbers of voters where even the number of complete simple games is not known. To be more precise, there are
284 432 730 174 complete simple games for nine voters, see e.g. [Kurz, 2012a] or [Freixas and Molinero, 2010],
while exact numbers are unknown for n ≥ 10. The fact that the exact numbers for the critical threshold values
cC(n) for complete simple games are known up to n = 16, indicates the great potential of our introduced algorith-
mic approach. Similar integer linear programming formulations can possibly be developed for other problems on
extremal voting schemes. Applications to related concepts like, e.g., the nucleolus or the cost of stability seem to
be promising.
In this paper we leave the question for the complexity to determine the criticial threshold value within a given
class of games open, but expect it to be in NP in general.
Concerning the discriminability of the hierarchy of α-roughly weighted simple games, it would be nice to prove
(if true) that there is a complete simple game χ with critical threshold value µ(χ) = pq for all integers p ≥ q.
Some first experiments let us conjecture that there even is a complete simple game with two types of voters and one
shift-minimal winning vector.
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As usual, the relation to other solution concepts from the game theory literature to the critical threshold value
should be studied. We have started this task by considering the cost of stability. Is turns out that the critical
threshold value is upper bounded by the cost of stability. From that, we could deduce an upper bound of
√
n for
super-additive games. For Boolean games the asymptotic extremal values coincide, while they can differ to a large
extent for concrete games.
The maximum critical threshold value can discriminate between the classes of simple games, complete simple
games, and weighted voting games, while the cost of stability can not. The concept of a dimension of a simple
game is not directly related to the critical threshold value.
The concept of α-weightedness seems very interesting. More research should be done in that direction. A
quite natural idea is to transfer the concept to ternary voting games, see e.g. [Felsenthal and Machover, 1997] and
[Freixas and Zwicker, 2003], or graph based games like e.g. network flow games. Also effectivity functions, see
e.g. [Storcken, 1997], might be candidates for a generalization of the basic concept. Last but not least, there are two
additional hierarchies of simple games described in [Gvozdeva et al., 2012] which deserve to be analyzed in more
detail.
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APPENDIX A. FURTHER SIDE RESULTS
In this appendix we mention some additional results, which are obtained with the techniques described in the paper,
but are a bit to specific to be included in the main part.
A.1. Strong or proper simple games. In Section 5 we have mentioned that one can easily model restrictions
within the class of simple games, e.g. consider proper or strong simple games. So, for each voting class X ∈
{B,S, C} let csX (n) denote the maximum critical threshold value of a game consisting of n voters in X , which is
strong. Similarly, we define cpX (n) for games which are proper and c
ps
X (n) for games which are proper and strong.
Numerical results for small numbers of voters are stated in Table 1.
n cC(n) c
p
C (n) c
s
C(n) c
ps
C (n)
7 87 ≈ 1.142857 1413 ≈ 1.076923 109 = 1.1 1
8 2621 ≈ 1.238095 3833 = 1.15 2621 ≈ 1.238095 1
9 43 = 1.3
6
5 = 1.2
4
3 = 1.3
13
12 = 1.083
10 3827 = 1.407
66
53 ≈ 1.245283 3827 = 1.407 2320 = 1.15
11 2215 = 1.46 1.290735
22
15 = 1.46
43
36 = 1.194
12 149 = 1.5
4
3 = 1.3 1.553571
59
48 = 1.22916
13 3320 = 1.65 ∈ [1.3620, 1.4211] 3320 = 1.65 ≈ 1.258772
14 11164 = 1.734375
111
64 = 1.734375 ≈ 1.298361
TABLE 1. The maximum critical threshold value for complete simple games restricted to strong
or proper games.
Obviously we have the inequalities cpsC (n) ≤ cpC(n) ≤ cC(n) and cpsC (n) ≤ csC(n) ≤ cC(n). Since adding
an additional player to an arbitrary complete simple game, which is winning on its own, yields a strong complete
simple game with equal critical threshold value, we also have csC(n) ≥ cC(n − 1), i.e. Conjecture 2 would imply
csC(n) ∈ Θ(
√
n). Looking at the numerical values of Table 1 one might conjecture cpC(n) ≤ csC(n) for all n. It
would be very nice to have a good lower bound construction for cpsC (n), which then would imply lower bounds for
cpC(n), c
ps
S (n), and c
p
S(n).
Lemma 15. For all k ≥ 2 we have csS(2k) ≥ k2 .
Proof. Consider the k coalitions Si := {2i− 1, 2i} for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and the 2k coalitions {a1, . . . , ak} with ai ∈ Si.
Let us denote the latter set of coalitions by A. We can easily check that those coalitions form an antichain so that
we can arbitrarily prescribe for each coalition whether it is winning or losing and there exist at least one simple
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n cS(n) c
p
S(n) c
s
S(n) c
ps
S (n)
5 65 = 1.2 1 1 1
6 32 = 1.5
4
3 = 1.3
3
2 = 1.5 1
7 127 ≈ 1.714286 75 = 1.4 53 = 1.6 43 = 1.3
8 2 32 = 1.5 2
7
5 = 1.4
9 209 = 2.2
5
3 = 1.6
11
5 = 2.2
3
2 = 1.5
TABLE 2. The maximum critical threshold value for simple games restricted to strong or proper games.
game χ meeting those conditions. Here we require that the coalitions Si are winning the coalitions {a1, . . . , ak}
are winning if and only if a1 = 1, a2 = 3 or a1 = 2, a2 = 4. Since the coalitions Si are winning we have
k ≤
k∑
i=1
w(Si) =
n∑
i=1
wi.
Since the coalitions inA∩L, where L denotes the set of losing coalitions, contain each voter with equal frequency,
we have
2k−1α
∑
A∈A∩L
w(A) =
(
n∑
i=1
)
· 2
k
2
· k
2k
.
Combining both inequalities gives α ≥ k2 . 
We remark that we have csS(n) ≤ cS(n) so that the bound from Lemma 15 is tight if Conjecture 1 is true.
Lemma 16. For all k ≥ 2 we have csS(2k + 5) ≥ 1 + k(k+1)2k+1 .
Proof. We will construct a class of examples by prescribing for some coalitions whether they are winning or losing.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k we require that the coalitions {i, i + 1} are winning. Let B := {2i − 1 | 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1} and
R := {2i | 1 ≤ i ≤ k}. Next we require
{2k + 2, 2k + 4} ∪B ∈ L {2k + 3, 2k + 5} ∪R ∈W,
{2k + 3, 2k + 5} ∪B ∈ L {2k + 2, 2k + 4} ∪R ∈W,
{2k + 2, 2k + 5} ∪B ∈W {2k + 3, 2k + 4} ∪R ∈ L,
{2k + 3, 2k + 4} ∪B ∈W {2k + 2, 2k + 5} ∪R ∈ L,
where L denotes the set of losing coalitions and W denotes the set of losing coalitions. The linear program for
the computation of the critical threshold value restricted on the mentioned coalitions has an optimal solution of
1 + k(k+1)2k+1 . 
We remark that the lower bound from Lemma 16 misses the value from Conjecture 1 only by 1n(n−4) . Since the
computed exact values for cS(n) from Table 2 coincide with the lower bounds from Lemma 15 and Lemma 16, we
conjecture that they are tight.
Unfortunately we can not use duality to obtain upper bounds for proper simple games from those for strong
simple games. To this end let us consider the class of examples from the proof of Lemma 15. We observe that all
coalitions of cardinality at least k+1 are winning so that each winning coalition of the dual game, which is strong,
has a cardinality of at least k. Thus we may choose weights wi = 1k for all voters so that the weight of each losing
coalition is at most 2 while the original game has a critical threshold value of max(1, k2 ).
Lemma 17. For n ≥ 3 we have cpB(n) = n.
Proof. Of course we have cpB(n) ≤ cB(n) = n. A proper example achieving this bound is given by the Boolean
game whose winning coalitions coincide with the coalitions of size one. 
Lemma 18. We have csB(n) = max(1, n− 1) for all n ∈ N.
Proof. Since the empty set is a losing coalition, its complement, the grand coalition, has to be winning. Thus
every losing coalition consists of at most n− 1 members. Choosing weights wi = 1 for all voters gives a feasible
weighting with α ≤ n − 1. For the other direction consider the strong game in Bn with n ≥ 3, whose losing
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n cB(n) c
p
B(n) c
s
B(n) c
ps
B (n)
1 1 1 1 1
2 2 1 1 1
3 3 3 2 2
4 4 4 3 3
5 5 5 4 4
6 6 6 5 5
7 7 7 6 6
8 8 8 7 7
9 9 9 8 8
TABLE 3. The maximum critical threshold value for Boolean games restricted to strong or proper games.
coalitions are the empty set and the coalitions of size n− 1. Since all coalitions of size 1 are winning, the weights
of the players have to be at least one so that the losing coalitions of cardinality n − 1 have a weight of at least
n− 1. 
Lemma 19. We have cpsB (n) = max(1, n− 1) for all n ∈ N.
Proof. Since cpsB (n) ≤ csB(n) = max(1, n − 1) it suffice to construct an example whose critical threshold value
reaches the upper bound. To this end we define the strong and proper Boolean game χ for n ≥ 3 as follows: The
empty coalition is loosing, the grand coalition is winning, coalitions with sizes between one and n−12 , coalitions
with sizes between n+12 and n − 1 are winning, and coalitions of cardinality n2 are winning if and only if they
contain voter 1. 
A.2. Restrictions on the number of shift-minimal winning vectors. Using the described ILP approach we may
also exactly determine the maximal alpha-values cC(n, 1) of complete simple games with n players and a single
shift-minimal winning coalition. As all complete simple games with at most six voters are roughly weighted we
have s˜(n, 1) = 1 for n = 6. The next exact values are given by
• cC(7, 1) = 109 ≈ 1.111111: (2, 5); (1, 2); (2, 0), (0, 5)
• cC(8, 1) = 65 = 1.2: (2, 6); (1, 2); (2, 0), (0, 6)
• cC(9, 1) = 1511 ≈ 1.272727: (2, 7); (1, 2); (2, 0), (0, 7)
• cC(10, 1) = 43 ≈ 1.333333: (2, 8); (1, 2); (2, 0), (0, 8)• cC(11, 1) ≈ 1.41176470588: (3, 8); (1, 3); (3, 0), (0, 8)
• cC(12, 1) = 32 = 1.5: (3, 9); (1, 3); (3, 0), (0, 9)• cC(13, 1) ≈ 1.57894736842: (3, 10); (1, 3); (3, 0), (0, 10)
• cC(14, 1) = 3320 = 1.65: (3, 11); (1, 3); (3, 0), (0, 11)
Here we also state the cardinality vector, the list of shift-minimal winning vectors, and the list of shift-maximal
losing vectors of an example reaching the upper bound cC(n, 1), respectively.
We can enhance our ILP formulations to additionally treat conditions on the shift-minimal winning coalitions
easily. For S ⊆ N we introduce a binary variable sS with the meaning that sS = 1 iff coalition S is a shift minimal
winning coalition. As conditions we have
sS ≤ xS
sS ≤ 1− xS′ ∀S′ ≺ S : ∄S′′ : S′ ≺ S′′ ≺ S
−xS +
∑
S′≺S:∄S′′:S′≺S′′≺S
xS′ + sS ≥ 0.
By setting ∑
S⊆N
sS = r
we can easily formulate exact values, lower or upper bounds for the number r of shift-minimal winning coalitions.
To be able to express the number t of equivalence classes of voters we introduce the functions ϕi : 2N → {0, 1}
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for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 where ϕi(S) = 1 iff a shift-minimal winning coalition S implies that voter i and voter i+ 1
have to be in different equivalence classes. We use binary variables pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 and the constraints
pi ≥ sS · ϕi(S) ∀S ⊆ N, 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
pi ≤
∑
S⊆N
sS · ϕi(S) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
n−1∑
i=1
pi = t.
Let us denote by cC(n, r, t) the maximum critical α-value of a complete simple game with r shift-minimal win-
ning coalitions consisting of n voters being partitioned into t equivalence classes. We have cC(7, 1, 2) = 109 ,
cC(7, 2, 2) = 1715 , cC(7, 3, 2) =
8
7 , cC(7, 4, 2) =
15
15 , cC(7, 5, 2) =
19
17 , and there are no such games for r ≥ 6. Ex-
amples of the corresponding sets of the shift-minimal winning coalitions are given by {35}, {41, 70}, {44, 49, 67},
{43, 44, 49, 67}, and {31, 60, 86, 88, 96}, respectively.
APPENDIX B. COMPARISION OF DIFFERENT ILP SOLVERS
We give some running time information for different ILP solvers in Table 4.
CPLEX CPLEX⋆ Gurobi 4.0.0 Gurobi 4.5.0
n nodes seconds nodes seconds nodes seconds nodes seconds
7 459 0.4 1113 0.7 975 0.5 582 0.4
8 3721 10 2271 3.7 1900 1.7 1715 1.8
9 3594 25 3297 14 3153 15 3724 12
10 11799 154 8974 94 12008 123 20988 83
11 33312 2052 42340 2131 29049 349 102306 979
12 55180 32379 45752 1301 215336 5403
13 94982 304255 64962 4318 83393 20408
14 97532 22230
15 152047 134118
16 308240 230964
TABLE 4. Comparing different ILP solvers (using 4 available kernels).
The solvers CPLEX 12.1.0 and Gurobi 4.0.0 are used with the standard parameter settings. Using the tuning op-
tion of CPLEX we find out that the parameter settings mip strategy heuristicfeq -1, mip strategy
probe -1, and mip strategy variableselect 4 might be better suited. The results are summarized
under column CPLEX⋆ of Table 4. We may say that these parameter settings might be good for small instances but
can not be generalized to larger instances easily.
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